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PAYETTE COUNTY NO. CV 2012-267 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
IN SUPPORT OF 
PETITION FOR REVIEW 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Harvey L. Mahler asks the Idaho Supreme Court to review the opinion of the 
Idaho Court of Appeals, 2014 Unpublished Opinion No. 56 (Ct. App. July 18, 2014) 
(hereinafter, Opinion). He submits that the Opinion, which affirmed the district court's 
order summarily dismissing his Petition for Post Conviction Relief (hereinafter, Petition), 
is in conflict with prior decisions of the Court of Appeals which have recognized that an 
intellectual disability that prevents the filing of a post-conviction petition triggers 
equitable tolling. 
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Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings 
In 2010, Mr. Mahler pleaded guilty to lewd conduct with a minor, and the district 
court imposed a unified sentence of eighteen years, with six years fixed. (R., p.8.) He 
did not appeal. (R., p.9.) 
On March 19, 2012, Mr. Mahler filed a petition for post-conviction relief, asserting 
that he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that he was denied a trial 
because of a lack of funds in Payette County. (R., p.9.) Specifically, he alleged that 
counsel denied his request to go to trial due to a lack of funds and failed to advise him 
of his appellate or Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (hereinafter, Rule 35) rights. (R., p.1 0.) In a 
supporting affidavit, Mr. Mahler asserted that his appointed attorney took advantage of 
his mental illness in order to save the county money. (R., p.13.) Further, while he 
requested a trial many times, counsel told him that "everyone with your crime needs to 
go to prison." (R., p.13.) Mr. Mahler asserted that counsel failed to obtain any physical 
evidence or conduct a pretrial investigation. (R., p.14.) He also asserted that counsel 
failed to provide him a copy of the Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI) 
for his review. (R., p.14.) 
The State answered, asserting, among other things, that the petition was 
untimely. (R., p.19.) The State then filed a motion for summary disposition on the basis 
that the petition was untimely. (Augmentation.)1 The State asserted that the statute of 
limitation expired on October 29, 2011, and that the petition was not filed until March 19, 
2012. (Augmentation.) Mr. Mahler responded, asserting that he suffered from bad 
health and brain trauma. (R., p.28.) Additionally, he asserted that his trial attorney 
1 A motion to augment the record was granted on May 22, 2014. 
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never discussed his appellate rights and that it was only after another inmate assisted 
him that he understood any of the deadlines. (R., pp.29-30) 
The district court then filed a notice of intent to dismiss on the basis that the 
petition was untimely. (Augmentation.) Mr. Mahler objected to the notice, asserting that 
the statute of limitation should be tolled due to mental illness. (Augmentation.) He then 
submitted affidavits of himself and Rick Caldwell. (R., pp.91, 93.) In his affidavit, 
Mr. Mahler stated that he suffered from head traumas in the past and had brain 
damage; as a result he remembered very little from the hearings in his criminal case 
and did not remember the time limit for filing a petition for post-conviction relief. 
(R., pp.91-92.) 
Mr. Caldwell met Mr. Mahler in 2010, when they were both in RDU. (R., p.93.) 
They became reacquainted in 2011. (R., p.94.) In 2010 and 2011, Mr. Mahler, "could 
barely talk and hardly write his own name." (R., p.94.) It was not until Mr. Mahler 
enrolled in classes in 2011, that his speech and writing ability began to improve. 
(R., p.94.) When Mr. Caldwell talked to Mr. Mahler, he had no understanding of what 
"Rule 35, appeal, or post-conviction" meant. (R., p.94.) At the time of the November 
2012 affidavit, "Mr. Mahler's understanding is better now that he has re-learned to talk 
and write, but he still struggles. His memory/recall is almost zero." (R., p.94.) Based 
on this, Mr. Caldwell did not believe that Mr. Mahler understood the requirements for 
filing a petition for post-conviction relief. (R., p.94.) 
After a hearing, the district court summarily dismissed the petition on the basis 
that it was untimely. (R., p.53; 12/20/12 Tr., p.21, Ls.4-1 0.) Mr. Mahler appealed. 
(R., p.56.) He asserted that the district court erred by summarily dismissing the petition 
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because he raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether his mental illness 
prevented him from timely filing his petition. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed. (See generally Opinion.) It held that, "[i]n short, 
Mahler's evidence shows that for some undefined period after his incarceration he did 
not understand that he could file a post-conviction action and did not know the statute of 
limitations. The same could undoubtedly be said for nearly every first-time inmate upon 
his or her arrival at a state prison." (Opinion, p.8.) Mr. Mahler petitioned for review. 
4 
ISSUE 
Should this Court grant review and hold that the district court erred by summarily 
dismissing Mr. Mahler's petition for post-conviction relief? 
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ARGUMENT 
This Court Should Grant Review And Hold That The District Court Erred By Summarily 
Dismissing Mr. Mahler's Petition For Post-Conviction Relief 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Mahler asserts that the Idaho Court of Appeals' opinion in his case is in 
conflict with prior opinions of the Idaho Court of Appeals which have recognized that an 
intellectual disability that prevents the filing of a post-conviction petition triggers 
equitable tolling. 
B. The Idaho Court Of Appeals' Opinion Affirming The District Court's Order 
Summarily Dismissing Mr. Mahler's Petition Is In Conflict With Prior Decisions Of 
The Court Of Appeals Which Hold That Inferences Made In a Petition Must Be 
Liberally Construed In Favor Of The Non-Moving Party To A Summary Dismissal 
Motion 
Idaho Appellate Rule 118(b) provides that, "[g) ranting a petition for review from a 
final decision of the Court of Appeals is discretionary on the part of the Supreme Court, 
and will be granted only when there are special and important reasons .... " Factors to 
be considered include whether the Opinion is in conflict with a previous decision of 
either the Idaho Supreme Court or the Idaho Court of Appeals. I.A.R. 118(b)(3). 
Mr. Mahler asserts that the Opinion in his case is in conflict with previous 
decisions of the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals has recognized equitable 
tolling of the statute of limitations for post-conviction proceedings where mental disease 
and/or psychotropic medication renders a petitioner incompetent and prevents him from 
earlier pursuing challenges to his conviction. Sayas v. State, 139 Idaho 957, 959 
(Ct. App. 2003). To toll the statute of limitations on account of mental illness or 
medication, a petitioner must show that he suffered from a serious mental illness which 
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rendered him incompetent to understand his legal right to bring an action within a year 
or otherwise rendered him incapable of taking necessary steps to pursue that right. 
Chico-Rodriguez v. State, 141 Idaho 579, 582 (Ct. App. 2005). 
In this case, the Court of Appeals held: "In short, Mahler's evidence shows that 
for some undefined period after his incarceration he did not understand that he could file 
a post-conviction action and did not know the statute of limitations. The same could 
undoubtedly be said for nearly every first-time inmate upon his or her arrival at a state 
prison." (Opinion, p.8.) Mr. Mahler respectfully submits that the record shows much 
more than this. As set forth in the Statement of Facts and in Section I(C), the evidence 
submitted indicated not just that Mr. Mahler did not understand the post-conviction 
procedure, but that he would have been incapable of filing a petition. A reasonable 
inference from the evidence is that a person who can barely speak or write their name 
could not prepare a petition for post-conviction relief. Further, Mr. Mahler had almost no 
memory, and a person with no memory could hardly be expected to be able to formulate 
grounds for relief in a petition. 
Because the Idaho Court of Appeals opinion is in conflict with prior decisions of 
the Court of Appeals, Mr. Mahler's Petition for Review should be granted. If the petition 
is granted, his case should be remanded back to the district court for further 
proceedings. 
C. If This Court Grants Mr. Mahler's Petition For Review, He Asserts That The 
District Court Erred By Summarily Dismissing His Petition For Post-Conviction 
Relief 
A post-conviction petition initiates a proceeding that is civil, rather than criminal, 
in nature, and like the plaintiff in a civil action, the applicant must prove his or her 
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allegations by a preponderance of the evidence. State v. Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437, 443 
(2008). But, unlike a plaintiff in other civil cases, the original post-conviction petition 
must allege more than merely "a short and plain statement of the claim." /d. at 443-444. 
Rather, the application must present, or be accompanied by, admissible evidence 
supporting the allegations contained therein, or else the post-conviction petition may be 
subject to dismissal. /d. In addition, the post-conviction petition must set forth with 
specificity the legal grounds upon which the application is based. Ridgley v. State, 148 
Idaho 671, 675 (201 0). 
A district court may summarily dismiss a post-conviction petition only where the 
petition, and evidence supporting the petition, fails to raise a genuine issue of material 
fact that, if resolved in the petitioner's favor, would entitle him or her to the relief 
requested. Yakovac, 145 Idaho at 444. Summary dismissal of a petition for post-
conviction relief is the procedural equivalent of summary judgment under I.R.C.P. 56. 
Knutsen v. State, 144 Idaho 433, 437-438 (Ct. App. 2007). The United States Supreme 
Court has defined the standard for whether there exists a genuine issue of material fact 
as whether "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the 
nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 'The 
inquiry performed is the threshold inquiry of determining whether there is the need for a 
trial -whether, in other words, there are any genuine factual issues that properly can be 
resolved in favor of either party." /d. at 250. If a genuine factual issue is presented, an 
evidentiary hearing must be conducted. Yakovac, 145 Idaho at 444. 
The underlying facts alleged by the petitioner "must be regarded as true" for 
purposes of summary dismissal. Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 247, 250 (2009). Any 
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disputed facts are construed in favor of the non-moving party, and "all reasonable 
inferences that can be drawn from the record are drawn in favor of the non-moving 
party." Vavold v. State, 148 Idaho 44, 45 (2009). The standards of review for the 
petitioner's underlying post-conviction claims also apply to "questions regarding the 
accrual of actions and the passage of the statute of limitations," including questions 
regarding the equitable tolling of the statute of limitations. Rhoades, 148 Idaho at 250. 
Additionally, this Court reviews the district court's determination and construction 
of the statute of limitations for a post-conviction petition de novo. State v. Martinez, 130 
Idaho 530, 532 (Ct. App. 1997). Idaho courts have recognized equitable tolling of the 
statute of limitations for post-conviction proceedings where mental disease and/or 
psychotropic medication renders a petitioner incompetent and prevents him from earlier 
pursuing challenges to his conviction. Sayas, 139 Idaho at 959. To toll the statute of 
limitations on account of mental illness or medication, a petitioner must show that he 
suffered from a serious mental illness which rendered him incompetent to understand 
his legal right to bring an action within a year or otherwise rendered him incapable of 
taking necessary steps to pursue that right. Chico-Rodriguez, 141 Idaho at 582. "It is 
not enough to show that compliance was simply made more difficult on account of a 
mental condition." /d. Equitable tolling only applies to the period the petitioner's mental 
illness actually prevented him from filing the post-conviction petitioner. /d. A district 
court's determination as to the severity of the mental condition and whether it satisfies 
the requirements for tolling is a factual determination reviewed under the applicable 
standard for the procedural posture of the appeal. See id. 
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As is set forth above, Mr. Mahler submitted affidavits of himself and Rick 
Caldwell. (R., pp.91, 93.) In his affidavit, Mr. Mahler stated that he suffered from head 
traumas in the past and had brain damage, and as a result, he remembered very little 
from the hearings in his criminal case, and also, he did not remember the time limit for 
filing a petition for post-conviction relief. (R., pp.91-92.) 
Mr. Caldwell met Mr. Mahler in 2010, when they were both in RDU. (R., p.93.) 
They became reacquainted in 2011. (R., p.94.) In 2010 and 2011, Mr. Mahler, "could 
barely talk and hardly write his own name." (R., p.94.) It was not until Mr. Mahler 
enrolled in classes in 2011, that his speech and writing ability began to improve. 
(R., p.94.) When Mr. Caldwell talked to Mr. Mahler, he had no understanding of what 
"Rule 35, appeal, or post-conviction" meant. (R., p.94.) At the time of the November, 
2012 affidavit, "Mr. Mahler's understanding is better now that he has re-learned to talk 
and write, but he still struggles. His memory/recall is almost zero." (R., p.94.) Based 
on this, Mr. Caldwell did not believe that Mr. Mahler understood the requirements for 
filing a petition for post-conviction relief. (R., p.94.) 
In addition to the affidavits, the district court took judicial notice of the 
competency hearings in the underlying criminal case. (12/20/12 Tr., p.13, Ls.4-15.) 
These hearings reveal that on January 15, 2010, Mr. Mahler was found incompetent to 
stand trial. (1/15/10 Tr., p.6, Ls.18-24.) At the subsequent hearing on April 16, 2010, 
Mr. Mahler was found competent. (4/16/10 Tr., p.25, Ls.3-10.) Susan Stumph, a 
clinical psychologist with the Department of Health and Welfare, testified that Mr. Mahler 
had a full scale IQ of 74, a verbal IQ of 71, and a performance IQ of 81. (4/16/10 
Tr., p.11, Ls.21-24.) She considered a verbal IQ of 71 to be "borderline" with regard to 
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the ability to assist in one's defense. (4/16/10 Tr., p.12, Ls.16-22.) At the entry of plea 
hearing, Mr. Mahler indicated that he made it to the ninth grade in school and could not 
read. (6/17/10 Tr., p.9, Ls.11-15.) 
The district court summarily dismissed the petition on the basis that the 
information submitted by Mr. Mahler and of which it had taken judicial demonstrated 
only that Mr. Mahler, "just didn't understand [the post-conviction procedure] until 
somebody explained it to him for a period of time." (12/20/12 Tr., p.20, Ls.19-20.) 
However, the district court noted that, "there's a legitimate issue here. I just, you can 
see I actually made this final thing sitting here. When I got down to it last night, it could 
go either way ... " (12/20/12 Tr., p.21, Ls.11-16.) 
Mr. Mahler respectfully disagrees with the district court's conclusion that the 
evidence shows only that Mr. Mahler did not understand the post-conviction procedure 
until it was explained to him. In his affidavit, Mr. Mahler stated that he suffered from 
head traumas in the past and had brain damage. (R., pp.91-92.) The social/sexual 
assessment from the underlying criminal case indicated that Mr. Mahler suffered from a 
head injury due to a farm accident, and that he had memory problems as a result. 
(Social/Sexual Assessment, p.4.) Mr. Mahler also told the presentence investigator that 
he had an injury and had received counseling as a result. (PSI, p.1 0.) 
Mr. Caldwell averred that in 2010 and 2011, the relevant time period,2 
Mr. Mahler, "could barely talk and hardly write his own name." (R., p.94.) It was not 
2 The district court concluded that Mr. Mahler was sentenced on September 17, 2010 
and the judgment was filed on September 22, 2010. Further, the court determined that 
the time period to file an appeal expired on November 3, 2010, and that the statute of 
limitation for post-conviction lapsed on November 3, 2011. (12/20/12 Tr., p.11, L.21 -
p.12, L.7.) 
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until Mr. Mahler enrolled in classes in 2011, that his speech and writing ability began to 
improve. (R., p.94.) Thus, the evidence submitted indicated not just that Mr. Mahler did 
not understand the post-conviction procedure, but that he would have been incapable of 
filing a petition- a person who can barely speak or write their name could not prepare a 
petition for post-conviction relief. Further, Mr. Mahler had almost no memory, and a 
person with no memory could hardly be expected to be able to formulate grounds for 
relief in a petition. 
Evidence that Mr. Mahler complained about a head injury can be found 
throughout the underlying criminal case; it cannot be said he conjured up a mental 
illness in the post-conviction case simply to excuse the statute of limitation. The effects 
from this injury were documented by a fellow inmate and sworn to in an affidavit. Even 
when he was determined to be competent, Mr. Mahler's ability to assist in his own 
defense was "borderline." Mr. Mahler could barely speak or write during the time period 
the statute of limitation was running. Mr. Mahler's difficulty was not simply failing to 
understand his post-conviction rights (though there is certainly evidence that this was 
the case); he was incapable, due to his head injury, of preparing his petition. The 




Mr. Mahler respectfully requests that this Court grant his Petition for Review. If 
granted, he requests that this Court vacate the district court's order summarily 
dismissing his petition and remand this case for further proceedings. 
DATED this 18th day of September, 2014. 
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